India’s Nuclear Doctrine

What are the foundations of India’s nuclear doctrine?

• In 1998 India conducted the Pokhran-II nuclear tests, establishing India as a nuclear-armed state. 
• 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine provided the initial framework for nuclear deterrence.
• 2003 Cabinet Committee on Security decision operationalised the doctrine and established the framework:
  
• Credible Minimum Deterrence: maintain only the nuclear capability necessary to deter nuclear attack.
• No First Use: India commits not to use nuclear weapons first.
• Massive retaliation: nuclear retaliation following a nuclear attack is intended to impose unacceptable costs on the adversary.
• Civilian control: nuclear weapons remain under political authority.
• Second-strike capability: forces must survive an initial attack sufficiently to enable retaliation.
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What has changed since the doctrine was formulated?

Strategic shift

• China has:
  
• Expanded and modernised its nuclear forces
• Strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control
• Deepened defence cooperation with Pakistan
• Pakistan has:
  
• Diversified its nuclear capabilities
• Developed tactical nuclear weapons
• Sought to offset India's conventional military advantage

Result:

• The original India-China and India-Pakistan strategic problems have become increasingly interconnected.
• India therefore has to consider the possibility of facing two closely aligned nuclear adversaries during a crisis.

Technological shift

• New technologies are changing the nuclear-deterrence environment.
• Important developments include:
  
• Artificial Intelligence
• Cyber capabilities
• Space-based surveillance
• Hypersonic weapons
• Ballistic missile defence
• These technologies can shorten decision-making timelines and increase the vulnerability of:
  
• Command-and-control systems
• Communication networks
• Early-warning systems
• Nuclear delivery systems

Key implication

• The fundamental principles of deterrence do not necessarily become irrelevant.
• Rather, the technological environment in which those principles operate has changed.

Geopolitical shift

• The Indo-Pacific has become a major arena of great-power competition.
• At the same time
  
• U.S.-China rivalry has intensified.
• China-Russia coordination has increased.
• India's strategic partnerships have expanded.
• The international system has become more multipolar.
• Therefore, India's nuclear doctrine cannot be understood solely through the traditional India-Pakistan bilateral deterrence framework.

Why should India be cautious about changing the doctrine?

• India's nuclear doctrine has contributed to its image as a restrained and responsible nuclear power.
• Ambiguity around established principles, particularly NFU, could create uncertainty.
• Uncertainty could encourage adversaries to recalibrate their strategies.
• It could also complicate crisis management.

Conclusion:

India's nuclear doctrine need not be treated as either immutable or disposable. A periodic review can preserve its core principles while ensuring that survivability, command and control, early warning and second-strike capabilities remain credible in a changing strategic and technological environment.