Introduction

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to skip the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, raises questions about India’s current stance towards the grouping. Is New Delhi losing interest in the SCO, or is it reconsidering its strategy?

The Genesis and Evolution of SCO

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was established in 2001, evolving from the Shanghai Five.
• The original group, formed in 1996, included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China.
• This formation aimed to address concerns over religious extremism and ethnic tensions following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which created 15 independent nations in Central Asia.
• In 2001, the addition of Uzbekistan transformed the Shanghai Five into the SCO, broadening its focus to include trade, connectivity, tourism, and more.

India’s Entry into the SCO

• India, along with Pakistan, joined the SCO in 2017.
• India’s interest in joining stemmed from its vision of a multipolar world and its long-standing desire to access Central Asia’s rich natural resources.  However, decades of tension with Pakistan had hindered these efforts.
• A 2017 government note highlighted the potential benefits of SCO membership, such as unique opportunities for constructive engagement with Eurasia.
• Plans for a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India via Pakistan and Afghanistan were discussed but ultimately derailed by security concerns.
• Additionally, the SCO was seen as a platform for pressuring Pakistan to take action against terrorism.

The Significance of SCO for India

• India’s initial enthusiasm for the SCO was influenced by Russia’s leading role in the organization and its emergence as a ‘non-West’ platform.
• However, the dynamics have shifted with the Ukraine war and China’s growing dominance overshadowing Russia.
• This changing landscape could explain Modi’s absence from the 2024 summit.
• Additionally, India’s relations with China and Pakistan are strained.
• The India-China border standoff in Ladakh, which began in 2020, remains unresolved, and tensions with Pakistan over terrorism persist.
• While India is unlikely to abandon the SCO, its future participation levels remain uncertain.

Challenges faced by SCO

• China’s Influence: China’s growing power in inner Asia worries other nearby countries.
• Institutional Weakness: The SCO lacks strong decision-making abilities.
• Divergent Member Interests: Member states have different political systems and goals, causing internal conflicts.
• Limited Geographical Focus: The SCO mainly focuses on Eurasia, limiting its global impact.
• Western Criticism: Western countries criticize the SCO for lacking democracy and supporting authoritarian regimes.
• Dispute Resolution: The SCO lacks effective ways to settle disagreements among its members.

Future Directions for SCO and India

• At the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar described India as non-West rather than anti-West.
• He emphasized India’s strategy of maintaining multiple options, which includes engagement with forums like the SCO, BRICS, and the Quad.
• However, India’s comfort with the SCO may diminish if it adopts an overtly anti-West stance, given the ongoing tensions between the West and China-Russia axis.

Conclusion

The SCO remains a significant platform for India, providing opportunities for regional engagement and cooperation. However, the changing geopolitical landscape and India’s evolving strategic priorities suggest a more cautious and selective approach to its participation. As New Delhi navigates its complex relations with China and Pakistan and balances its non-West stance, the future of its involvement in the SCO will be closely watched.