Introduction
The process of appointing judges in India has been a subject of ongoing debate, especially in light of the immense backlog of cases and the high number of judicial vacancies. As of April 2024, over 60 lakh cases remained pending in various High Courts, with 30% of judicial seats unfilled. This situation underscores the urgent need for reform in the judicial appointment process, balancing transparency, efficiency, and judicial independence.
Historical Context of Judicial Appointments
- Historically, the appointment of judges in India was guided by established conventions, with significant influence from the collegium system. This system, developed through judicial pronouncements rather than constitutional provisions, allows a group of senior judges, led by the Chief Justice of India (CJI), to recommend appointments and transfers of judges in the higher judiciary.
- The collegium system emerged from a series of landmark Supreme Court judgments, beginning with the First Judges Case (1981, where the Court held that the President of India is the final authority in judicial appointments, not bound by the advice of judges.
- This decision was later overturned by the Second Judges Case (1993), which established the collegium system, giving primacy to the judiciary in these matters.
- The Third Judges Case (1998) further refined this system, expanding the collegium to include the CJI and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.
- Despite its intention to safeguard judicial independence, the collegium system has faced criticism for its lack of transparency and potential for nepotism.
- This led to the enactment of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act in 2014, which sought to replace the collegium system with a more inclusive body that involved both the judiciary and the executive. However, the Fourth Judges Case (2015) saw the Supreme Court striking down the NJAC Act, reaffirming the collegium system as the primary mechanism for judicial appointments.
The Collegium System vs. NJAC: A Comparative Analysis
- The collegium system has been criticized for its lack of transparency, accountability, and its susceptibility to favoritism.
- Despite these concerns, it remains the prevailing method for judicial appointments in India.
- On the other hand, the NJAC aimed to address these issues by involving members of the judiciary, executive, and civil society in the appointment process.
- However, the Supreme Court declared the NJAC unconstitutional, citing concerns over the potential erosion of judicial independence.
- Proponents of the NJAC argue that it could lead to faster appointments and a more balanced approach, but its rejection highlights the judiciary’s resistance to external influence in judicial appointments.
- The debate between these two systems underscores the broader challenge of achieving a balance between judicial independence and accountability.
Why Reform Is Essential ?
The need for reform in the judicial appointment process is evident from several critical issues:
- Charges of Nepotism and Favoritism: The collegium system lacks clear guidelines for selecting judges, which can lead to biased appointments and the exclusion of deserving candidates.
- Misuse of Power: The concentration of power within the judiciary, without adequate checks and balances, raises concerns about the potential misuse of this authority.
- Lack of Transparency: The opaque nature of the collegium system undermines public trust in the judiciary and the legal system.
- Social Diversity: The lack of representation from marginalized communities and women in higher judiciary positions highlights the system’s failure to promote social diversity. Data from the Union Law Ministry reveals a significant underrepresentation of backward and minority communities among judicial appointees.
- Judicial Vacancies: With over 300 judicial positions vacant across High Courts, the backlog of cases continues to grow, further straining the justice system.
History of Conflict between Judiciary and Executive First Judges Case (1981): The Supreme Court ruled that the term “consultation” under Article 124 of the Constitution does not mean “concurrence.” This meant that the President was not bound by the Chief Justice of India’s (CJI) advice when appointing judges.Second Judges Case (1993): The Supreme Court overturned its previous decision from the First Judges Case, ruling that “consultation” indeed means “concurrence.” The Court established that the CJI must provide recommendations in consultation with a collegium, consisting of the CJI and the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.Third Judges Case (1998): The Supreme Court expanded the collegium to a five-member body, which includes the CJI and the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. This further reinforced judicial control over the appointment process.99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014: The NJAC was introduced as an independent body intended to replace the Collegium System for appointing judges to the higher judiciary. The NJAC was to be a six-member body comprising:The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as the ex-officio Chairperson ,Two senior-most Supreme Court judges as ex-officio members, The Union Minister of Law and Justice as an ex-officio member, Two eminent persons from civil society, nominated by a committee consisting of the CJI, the Prime Minister of India, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. One of these eminent persons was to be chosen from among SC/ST/OBC/minorities or women.The Act also empowered any two members of the NJAC to veto a recommendation if they disagreed with it.Fourth Judges Case (2015):The Supreme Court declared the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act unconstitutional. The Court struck down the NJAC and reaffirmed the Collegium System, ruling that the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary and undermined the basic structure of the Constitution. |
Suggested Reforms
To address these challenges, the following reforms have been suggested:
- Consultation and Consensus: Involve all relevant stakeholders in reforming the judicial appointment process.
- Reform the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP): Update the MoP to make the appointment process more transparent and inclusive.
- Public Service Cadre for Retired Judges: Create a pool of retired judges to help fill vacancies and maintain continuity in the judiciary.
- Broader Judicial Reforms: Implement wider reforms to tackle issues like contract enforcement, high litigation costs, and inconsistent judicial decisions.
Lessons from Other Countries
- India can learn from the judicial appointment processes in other countries. For instance, the UK’s Judicial Appointments Commission involves a selection committee comprising members from the judiciary, legal profession, and laypersons.
- Similarly, in the US, judicial appointments are made by the President, with Senate confirmation.
- Germany adopts a hybrid approach, where both the executive and legislature play a role in judicial appointments.
- In France, judges are selected with input from the High Council of the Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature). For lower courts, the Minister of Justice appoints judges, often after consulting with the High Council.
Conclusion
The ongoing debate over judicial appointments in India reflects the complex challenge of balancing independence, transparency, and efficiency. While the collegium system has served as a safeguard against external interference, its shortcomings necessitate thoughtful reforms. By learning from global best practices and involving a wider range of stakeholders, India can develop a judicial appointment process that enhances the credibility and effectiveness of its judiciary, ensuring justice for all.